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Abstract 
This paper presents an analysis of the relative economic efficiency of rural 
commercial and development banks in Bangladesh using a normalized profit function. 
Contrary to the experiences of other developing countries, the development banks are 
relatively more technical and price efficient in producing loans than commercial banks. 
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In many developing countries, both agricultural development banks and commercial 
banks are used to disburse cheap funds to agriculture. But policymakers, donor agencies 
and academicians are usually more concerned with the performance of development banks 
than with commercial banks because of the high social cost of subsidies associated with 
development bank operations. Are commercial banks really more efficient than 
development banks in rural financial markets? The answer to this question has policy 
implications for improving the performance of rural financial markets. But there have been 
few studies to carefully test the relative efficiency of rural commercial and development 
banks. As a result, the suggestion that commercial banks are more efficient may be a mis-
representation and their expansion may not lead to the efficient performance of rural 
financial markets. 
It is frequently argued in the rural finance literature that development banks are not 
efficent because of (a) high default rates (Von Pischke); (b) financial indiscipline due to 
political intervention of the government (Blair; Kane; Von Pischke); and (c) imperfect 
information and high costs of supervision (Bourne and Graham; Cuevas and Graham; 
Graham and Bourne). Some researchers have provided empirical evidence suggesting that 
commercial banks perform better than development banks (e.g., Cuevas and Graham; 
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Graham and Bourne). But this evidence is rather questionable because most studies have 
failed to directly compare commercial and development banks in the same market area, and 
have not explicitly recognized the differences in lending behavior and loan portfolios 
between the two bank types. The share of rural loans to total loans is often much smaller 
for commercial banks than development banks. As a result, the findings of these studies 
may be misleading. Strong policy conclusions can only be generated by using rural bank 
data that compares banks operating in the same market. 
This study is unique because it uses rural bank data from commercial and development 
bank branches in Bangladesh to directly test the relative economic efficiency of the two 
branch types. 
THE BANGLADESH RURAL BANKING SYSTEM 
Since independence in 1971, there have been several structural changes in the 
Bangladesh banking system. All commercial banks, except foreign banks, were nationalized 
in March, 1972. Six banks were created out of the twelve nationalized commercial banks 
(NCBs). In addition, there are three development banks - one for industrial development 
and the other two for agricultural development. Agricultural development banks have been 
operating in rural areas since 1962. 
Beginning in 1977, commercial banks were induced to disburse more rural loans. 
During the 1978-81 period, all banks were required to open two rural branches for every 
new urban branch authorized under a "two-for-one" branching policy. Currently about 67 
and 91 percent of the NCB and development bank branches, respectively, are rural. But 
only 24 percent of the total NCB loan portfolio is rural, and the NCBs share of total rural 
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lending is only 34 percent (Bangladesh Bank). Because of their specialization and long 
experience in rural lending, there are reasons to believe that development banks may be 
more efficient than commercial banks, contrary to the experience found in some other 
developing countries. 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
A bank is economically efficient if it operates with both technical and price efficiency 
(Richard and Villanueva). Consider the production function of two banks: 
0 1 = A1F(X1); 0 2 = A2F(X2) 
where O is output, A is a technical efficiency parameter, X is a vector of inputs employed, 
and F refers to the production function. Subscripts 1 and 2 refer to banks 1 and 2. 
A bank is said to be more technical efficient than another if it produces a larger output 
from the same set of inputs. If A1 > A2, then bank 1 is more technical efficient than bank 
2. A bank is price efficient if it maximizes profit, i.e., equates the marginal value product 
of each factor to its price. It is possible for a bank to be technical efficient but not price 
efficient. 
The usual marginal condition of profit maximization does not hold for banks that are 
price inefficient and pursue diverse goals other than maximizing profits. In this situation, 
the marginal conditions are given by -
(1) 
where, i, j,r,11; refer to input type, bank type, input price, and a constant parameter to 
distinguish between profit maximizing and non-profit maximizing banks, respectively. If K. = 1 
then the bank is profit maximizer and if K./: 1 then the bank is not a profit maximizer and 
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equates marginal revenue with a constant (1t) times the price of inputs. This may be the 
case with the nationalized banking sector in Bangladesh when banks pursue the objectives 
set by the government. Lau, and Lau and Y otopoulos argued that the revised marginal 
condition is consistent with over-or-under valuation of the opportunity costs of the resources, 
and the satisficing behavior of a firm. 
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
A normalized profit function is used to test the relative economic efficiency of 
commercial and development bank branches in Bangladesh so that the function can 
differentiate between profit maximizing and satisficing firms, and can avoid simultaneous 
bias between quantity and price (Lau; Lau and Yotopoulos). The empirical model is 
developed following the neo-classical framework. In addition to prices of inputs and 
outputs, differences in profits may be explained by institutional characteristics, and 
management ability (Aron; Clark; Hannan; Lucas; Mullineaux; Oi; Rhoades; Short). 
The rural bank branches make two types of loans - refinanciable target loans 
(government sponsored loan programs), LT and non-target commercial loans, L'IT. In 
addition, they can lend to (Lit) and borrow from (Bh) their head office. Interest rates on 
target and non-target loans are set by the Central Bank and are uniform across branches, 
but interest rates on loans to or from the head office are set by the head office. 
Target loan terms and conditions of disbursement and recovery are set by the Central 
Bank. Risks for target loans are higher than for non-target loans because of government 
intervention in target loan allocation and recovery to achieve political objectives (Blair; 
Kane; Khalily and Meyer). As a result, some portion of interest and principal may never 
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be recovered. It is assumed that branch managers consider effective interest rates (adjusted 
for loan losses) in allocating financial resources. The loss adjusted target loan interest rate 
is defined as P-r and the loss adjusted non-target loan interest rate as P,,r Loans to the head 
office are risk free. In Bangladesh, interest rates on loans to and from the head office are 
the same, and they are expressed as a single price of netput, (Li,-Bh). 
Target loans are largely refinanced by the Central Bank at interest rates lower than the 
interest rates paid on deposits. In other words, banks receive an interest subsidy for making 
target loans if they rediscount them with the Central Bank. The development banks 
refinance most of their loans and, therefore, receive a large subsidy from the Central Bank. 
They are more oriented towards making loans than mobilizing deposits. The interest 
subsidies obtained from refinanced loans are retained by the head office rather than passed 
on to individual branches. Our study showed that about 65 percent of the NCB branches 
are net lenders to their head office, and about 85 percent of the development bank branches 
are net borrowers from their head office. This implies that development bank branches 
generally make more loans than they mobilize in deposits while the NCB branches 
essentially mobilize deposits to transfer to their head offices. 
Rural branches use two major inputs - deposits and labor - in loan production. If 
rural deposits mobilized by branches are insufficient to meet loan demands, branches can 
borrow from their head office at interest rates lower than the refinance rates. Interest rates 
on deposits of different types are set by the Central Bank, and the wages of branch 
employees are set by the government. Branches vary in the cost of deposits and labor by 
varying their mix of deposits and employees (officers and staff). 
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Given the above framework and following Lau, and Lau and Y otopoulos, the 
normalized profit function for testing absolute and relative efficiency is specified as follows1: 
(2) 
where i = target, non-target loans; m = deposits, labor, and Z is a vector of fixed inputs and 
control variables. The fixed inputs include fixed assets, and the control variables represent 
age of branch, regional per-capita income, total deposits and loans, and branch managers' 
management ability measured by years of schooling and banking experience levels. By 
duality, loan supply (eq.3) and factor demand functions (eq.4) are specified as follows -
2 2 s 
L, = ai+ L aifpj+ L «u..Kirl 111 + L «uZs (3) 
J•l ,.... &=l 
1[ 2 2 s ] 
x"' = -- a"'+ E amv'IC./"' + E a,"'p,+ E a,,,;z" 
K111 v=l l=l s=l 
(4) 
where X refers to the inputs of deposits and labor. 
The parameters in eqs. (2) thru ( 4) were estimated as a system using the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator on pooled data from 84 randomly selected rural banks for 1987 and 
1988. Because of the large number of parameters and limited number of observations, the 
1 Details of the model are available from the authors on request. 
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symmetry condition was imposed. Data for 1987 and 1988 were collected directly from the 
branches through a structured questionnaire. Prices of loans were defined as interest loss 
adjusted interest rates, (1-Di)Pni, where i=target and non-target loans; pn is the nominal 
interest rate; and Di refers to degree of interest loss which varies between 0 and 1. Di was 
determined based on the classification of overdue rural loans by the Central Bank. It 
classifies overdue loans into substandard (no payment received in three years), doubtful (no 
payment received in 5 years), and bad (no payment received within 5 years of due date, and 
some other unique circumstances such as death of borrowers). The Central Bank requires 
that no, 50 percent, and 100 percent provisions are made, respectively, for substandard, 
doubtful, and bad loans during the year the classification is made. If there are no doubtful 
or bad overdue loans, there there is no interest loss. Thus, Di is the ratio of doubtful and 
bad overdue loans to total overdue loans. Wages and deposit interest rates were defined 
as weighted annual average wages and interest rates. Bank type was introduced as a dummy 
variable: 1 for NCBs and 0 otherwise. Reported profits were adjusted for interest loss. The 
price and profit variables were normalized by the interest rate of netput. About 38 percent 
of the rural branches based on reported profits were unprofitable, and this proportion 
increased to 46 percent when profits were adjusted for interest loss. Interest rates on 
netput for the NCB branches were 12.5 percent, and 9.5 percent for the development bank 
branches. 
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
The parameter estimates along with the definition of variables are reported in Table 
1. The results are consistent with expectations, and most of the variables are statistically 
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significant. Economic efficiency was tested both in absolute and relative terms. The Wald 
chi-square test rejected the null hypothesis of absolute price efficiency with respect to labor 
and deposits (Kw= 1, Kd = 1 ). The estimated coefficient of 3.29 being greater than 1 for Kw 
implies that the marginal cost of labor is less than marginal revenue. The estimated 
coefficient of 0.20 (less than 1) for Kd suggests that the marginal cost of deposits is higher 
than their marginal revenue. In other words, labor is underutilized and deposits are costly. 
The relative price efficiency with respect to the inputs, labor and deposits, was also 
tested to evaluate the marginal technical substitution between the two inputs. To equate 
the marginal rate of technical substitution with the factor price ratio, Kw must be equal to 
Kd. The Wald chi-square test rejected this null hypothesis implying that the branches are 
not operating on the profit-maximizing input expansion path. 
The relative price efficiency with respect to inputs by bank was tested by evaluating 
the parameters A39 and A49• If A39 and A.i9 are insignificant, then there is no relative price 
efficiency. The sign of A39 is positive, while A.i9 is negative. The Wald chi-square test 
rejected the null hypothesis that A39 = 0 and A49 = 0. This result suggests that NCBs are 
relative price efficient with respect to wages, while development banks are relative price 
efficient with respect to deposit interest rates. 
The relative output price differences for the commercial and development banks were 
tested by evaluating the interaction parameters of target and non-target interest rates with 
the bank dummy variables (A19 and A29). The Wald chi-square test rejected the null 
hypothesis that A19 =0, but could not reject A29 =0. Since the coefficient of A19 is negative 
and significant, the development banks have a higher average effective price in target loans 
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than NCBs. In addition, there is no significant difference in effective non-target interest 
rates between commercial and development banks. 
The relative technical efficiency by bank was examined by evaluating the parameters 
A;, Aib and ~b· The partial differentiation of profit with respect to the bank type variable, 
evaluating at the geometric means, showed that the NCB branches are not relative technical 
efficient compared to development banks. This result is supported further when relative 
technical efficiency is evaluated in terms of deposits and loans. 
The relative technical efficiency of banks in terms of loans and deposits is examined 
by evaluating the parameters A1b and ~b· The parameter, A1b, is negative and significant. 
The Wald chi-square test rejected the null hypothesis that Aib=O suggesting that 
development banks are relative technical efficient with respect to loans made. On the other 
hand, the insignificant coefficient for parameter, ~b' suggests that there is no significant 
difference in technical efficiency with respect to deposits. 
SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The empirical results of the profit function are consistent with expectations. Rural 
banks in Bangladesh are neither profit maximizers nor absolute price efficient. However, 
development banks are relative price efficient in deposits, while NCBs are relative price 
efficient in wages. The rural branches are not price efficient because of the constraints 
imposed by the government. However, neither commercial nor development banks differ 
in the effective average price of non-target loans but the development banks have higher 
average effective target loan interest rates. These results suggest that development bank 
branches are more efficient in making target loans because, by the definition of effective 
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interest rates, their target loan loss is lower than commercial banks. This result is also 
supported by the fact that development banks are relatively more technical efficient in 
making loans. No bank is technical efficient in deposit mobilization. 
These findings are different from previous studies that argued that commercial banks 
are more efficient than development banks. This study is an improvement over previous 
studies because it directly compared the rural branches of commercial and development 
banks. It is possible, however, that at the aggregate level commercial banks may be 
relatively more efficient than development banks since a large portion of their total loan 
portfolio is urban, while the development banks are generally restricted to rural operations. 
A major issue is how the efficiency of both commercial and development banks can 
be increased so that the performance of rural financial markets can be improved and 
Central Bank subsidies reduced. There are two plausible alternatives: first, liberalize the 
territorial restrictions for development banks so they can open urban branches and directly 
compete with commercial banks for urban deposits and investments. By expanding their 
volume, they can also reap the benefits of their relative price and technical efficiency in 
rural financial markets. Alternatively, commercial banks that can cross subsidize their rural 
operations with profits from urban branches may be encouraged to increase their rural loan 
portfolio. This will reduce the demand for Central Bank subsidies for rural lending, and will 
force the urban bank customers to pay for the inefficiency of rural operations. But since the 
development banks are relatively more technical and price efficient in rural areas, the first 
option is expected be more effective because: (a) it will also force commercial banks to 
improve their efficiency, and (b) the amount of subsidy from the Central Bank will decline 
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since development banks will be able to increasingly finance rural lending with urban 
deposits. 
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Table 1 
Parameter Estimates of the Normalized Profit Function 
arameter Coe c1ent -rat10 
AO -1.44 -1. 1 * 
Al 2.38 11.08* 
A2 0.78 2.75* 
A3 -3.73 -5.24* 
KW 3.29 6.27* 
A4 -0.19 -2.67* 
KD 0.20 7.17* 
A5 2.71 1.12*** 
A6 -2.05 -0.29 
A7 8.21 1.18*** 
AS -78.74 -4.37* 
A9 1.96 2.52* 
AF -0.38 -1.85* 
AD -0.04 -1.21 *** 
AL 0.16 20.42* 
All 288.94 6.99* 
A12 -28.94 -1.43** 
A13 3.27 1.08*** 
A14 -15.84 -0.52 
A16 -10.14 -3.17* 
A17 -1.01 -0.56 
A18 24.43 2.28* 
A19 -1.25 -5.05* 
A22 81.29 3.26* 
Note: * Significant at 5 percent level. 
** Significant at 10 percent level. 
* * * Significant at 15 percent level. 
Parameter 
A24 -53.60 
A26 2.10 
A27 -4.53 
A28 8.87 
A29 -0.02 
A33 0.78 
A34 40.94 
A36 -1.50 
A37 -0.33 
A39 1.95 
A44 -1,070.20 
A46 -8.28 
A47 4.51 
A48 64.33 
A49 -0.12 
A55 -0.07 
A66 0.18 
A77 -0.14 
A67 0.15 
A88 5.00 
ADB 0.01 
ALB -0.09 
- quare = 0.99 
-3.24* 
1.45** 
2.73* 
0.76 
-0.05 
1.11 *** 
5.72* 
-3.11 * 
-1.94* 
2.81* 
-3.05* 
-5.22* 
2.41* 
2.46* 
-1.57* 
-0.98 
0.56 
-1.66* 
0.62 
1.76* 
0.42 
-8.42* 
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Parameters and Variables in Profit Function 
Parameter Variable Definition 
Al 1LRATE TARGEf LOAN INIBRESf RATE 
A2 NTLRATE NON-TARGEf LOAN INIBRESf RATE 
A3 WAGE AVERAGE WAGE PER EMPLOYEE 
A4 DEPRATE AVERAGE DEPOSIT INIBRESf RATE 
A5 AGE AGEOF RURAL BANK 
A6 EDU EDUCATION OF BANK MANAGER 
A7 EXP EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF BANK MANAGER 
AB GDP PER CAPITA AGRICULTURAL GDP AT UPAZILLA LEVEL 
A9 BANK DUMMY VARIABLE: -1 FOR NCB, 0 OTIIERWISE 
AF FXASf FIXED ASSEfS 
AD DEPOSITS TOTAL DEPOSITS 
AL LOANS TOTAL LOANS 
ALB LONBANK INIBRACTION OF LOANS AND BANK TYPE 
ADB DEBANK INIBRACTION OF DEPOSITS AND BANK TYPE 
All 1LRATE2 QUADRATIC TERM OF 1LRATE 
A12 1LNTL INIBRACTION OF 1LRATE AND NTLRATE 
A13 1LWAGE INIBRACTION OF 1LRATE AND WAGE 
A14 1LDEP INIBRACTION OF 1LRATE AND DEPRATE 
A16 1LEDU INIBRACTION OF 1LRATE AND EDU 
A17 1LEXP INIBRACTION OF 1LRATE AND EXP 
A18 1LGDP INIBRACTION OF 1LRATE AND GDP 
A19 1LBANK INIBRACTION OF 1LRATE AND BANK TYPE 
A22 NTLRATE2 QUADRATIC TERM OF NTLRATE 
A23 NTLWAGE INIBRACTION OF NTLRATE AND WAGE 
A24 NTLDEP INIBRACTION OF NTLRATE AND DEPRATE 
A26 NTLEDU INIBRACTION OF NTLRATE AND EDU 
A27 NTLEXP INIBRACTION OF NTLRATE AND EXP 
A28 NTLGDP INIBRACTION OF NTLRATE AND GDP 
A29 NTLBANK INIBRACTION OF NTLRATE AND BANK 
A34 WAGEDEP INIBRACTION OF WAGE AND DEPRATE 
A36 WAGEEDU INIBRACTION OF WAGE AND EDU 
A37 WAGEEXP INIBRACTION OF WAGE AND EXP 
A39 WAGEBANK INIBRACTION OF WAGE AND BANK 
A44 DEPRATE2 QUADRATIC TERM OF DEPRATE 
A46 DEPEDU INIBRACTION OF DEPRATE AND EDU 
A47 DEPEXP INIBRACTION OF DEPRATE AND EXP 
A48 DEPGDP INIBRACTION OF DEPRATE AND GDP 
A49 DEPBANK INIBRACTION OF DEPRATE AND BANK TYPE 
A55 AGE2 QUADRATIC TERM OF AGE 
A66 EDU2 QUADRATIC TERM OF EDU 
A77 EXP2 QUADRATIC TERM OF EXP 
A67 EDUEXP INIBRACTION OF EDU AND EXP 
A88 GDP2 QUADRATIC TERM OF GDP 
14 
REFERENCES 
Aron, D.J., "Ability, Moral Hazard, Firm Size and Diversification", RAND Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 19, 1988: 72-87. 
Bangladesh Bank, Scheduled Banks Statistics, Dhaka, December, 1987. 
Blair, H.W., "Agricultural Credit, Political Economy, and Patronage", in D.W Adams, 
D.H.Graham and J.D.Von Pischke (eds.), Undermining Rural Development With 
Cheap Credit, Boulder Co.:Westview Press, 1984: 183-193. 
Bourne, C and D.H.Graham, "Problems With Specialized Agricultural Lenders", in D.W 
Adams, D.H.Graham and J.D.Von Pischke (eds.), Undermining Rural Development 
With Cheap Credit, Boulder Co.:Westview Press, 1984: 36-48. 
Clark, J.A., Alternative Explanation of Commercial Bank Behavior and the Structure-
Conduct Performance Hypothesis, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1980. 
Cuevas, C.E. and D.H.Graham, "Agricultural Lending Costs in Honduras", in D.W Adams, 
D.H.Graham and J.D.Von Pischke (eds.), Undermining Rural Development With 
Cheap Credit, Boulder Co.:Westview Press, 1984: 96-103. 
Graham, D.H. and C.Bourne, "Agricultural Credit and Rural Progress in Jamaica", in J.D. 
Von Pischke, D.W Adams and G. Donald (eds.), Rural Financial Markets in 
Developing Countries, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983: 
190-199. 
Hannan, T.H., "Expense Preference Behavior in Banking: A Re-examination", Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 87, No. 4, 1979: 891-895. 
Kane, E.J., "Political Economy of Subsidizing Agricultural Credit in Developing Countries", 
in D.W Adams, D.H.Graham and J.D.Von Pischke (eds.), Undermining Rural 
Development With Cheap Credit, Boulder Co.:Westview Press, 1984: 166-182. 
Khalily, M.A.B and R.L.Meyer, "Political Economy and Rural Loan Recovery: An Example 
from Bangladesh", Economics and Sociology Occasional Paper No. 1773, Department 
of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, Ohio State University, Columbus, 
November, 1990. 
Lau, L.J., "Applications of Profit Functions", in M.Fuss and D.M. McFadden (eds.), 
Production Economics: A Dual Approach to Theory and Applications, North-
Holland, 1978. 
15 
Lau, L.J and P.A.Yotopoulos, "A Test of Relative Efficiency and Applications to Indian 
Agriculture", American Economic Review, March, 1971: 94-109. 
Lucas, R.E., Jr., "On the Size Distribution of Business Firms", The Bell Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 9, 1978: 508-523. 
Mullineaux, D.J., "Economies of Scale and Organizational Efficiency in Banking: A Profit 
Function", Journal of Finance, Vol. 33, 1978: 259-280. 
Oi, W.Y., "Heterogenous Firms and the Organization of Production", Economic Inguhy, 
Vol. 21, 1983: 147-171. 
Rhoades, S.A., "Entry and Competition in Banking", Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 
4, 1970: 143-150. 
Richard, D., and D. Villanueva, "Relative Economic Efficiency of Banking System in a 
Developing Country", Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 4, 1980: 315-334. 
Short, B.K., "The Relation Between Commercial Bank Profit Rates and Banking Concentra-
tion in Canada, Western Europe and Japan", Journal of Banking and Finance. Vol.3, 
1979: 209-212. 
Von Pischke, J.D., "The Pitfalls of Specialized Farm Credit Institutions in Low Income 
Countries", in J.D. Von Pischke, D.W Adams and G. Donald (eds.), Rural Financial 
Markets in Developing Countries, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1983: 175-182. 
